Tulsa Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 1

1979

Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage
Catherine M. Cullem

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Catherine M. Cullem, Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 Tulsa L. J. 141
(2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss1/8

This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Cullem: Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage

FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS AND THE
QUESTION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
I.

INTRODUCTION

There has been an increasing demand by the homosexual community for governmental and societal recognition of the individual rights
and human dignity of homosexuals. Homosexuals and others have
contested state sodomy laws1 and employment discrimination,2 as well
as state prohibitions against same-sex marriage.' Challenges to crimi1. State regulation of private sexual conduct between consenting adults through criminal
sodomy and fornication statutes has been the topic of many legal publications. See, e.g., L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 941-48 (1978); Note, The Constitutionalityof Laws Forbidding
Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PrivateHomosexual Conduct]; Note, Fornication, Cohabitation,and the Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REV. 252
(1978). The thrust of the arguments raised by homosexuals, and heterosexuals as well, is that such
laws, when applied to consensual adult activity, infringe upon the individual's right to privacy as
enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and as developed in a line of
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the right of privacy includes a woman's decision to have an abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (although
decided on first amendment grounds, it was noted that the right to be free from governmental
intrusion into an individual's privacy is fundamental); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
2. For an excellent discussion of the economic problems faced by homosexuals, see Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REv. 687 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The
Homosexual'sLegalDilemma]. As pointed out by the author of that comment, "fair employment
for the homosexual has as its tragic flaw the subconscious prejudices inherent in human decision."
Id. at 687.
3. Challenges to such prohibitions have been based on a number of constitutional amendments, including the first, eighth, ninth and fourteenth amendments. See Baker v. Nelson, 291
Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The major attack
against same-sex marriage prohibitions, however, has been based on the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See notes 15-28 infra and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the probable disposition of the other constitutional challenges levied against
existing marriage definitions, see Note, The Legality of HomosexualMarriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573,
573-74 n.3 (1973).
The argument has also been advanced that the passage of an Equal Rights Amendment,
presumably on either the federal or state level, would subject present marriage definitions to critical judicial scrutiny. Id. at 583-88. It is argued that marriage laws which permit a man to marry a
woman but prohibit him from marrying another man draw impermissible sex classifications in
derogation of an Equal Rights Amendment. This situation is compared to that in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), wherein the Court held that an antimiscegenation statute, which treated
all races equally in the sense that Caucasians were prohibited from marrying Negroes and viceversa, violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 584-85. The difficulty with this analogy, however, is that the proposed Equal Rights Amendment creates no new rights; it merely ensures that
presently existing and future rights shall not be denied on the basis of impermissible sex classifications. See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The EqualRightsAmendment:.A Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). Unless it can be shown,
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nal sodomy statutes have met with a measure of success based upon a
privacy right of sexual choice between consenting adults. Similarly,
there has been some favorable recognition that employment should be
based upon ability and job performance rather than the sexual preference of the employee.' There has yet to be, however, any successful
challenge to state definitions of marriage which preclude homosexuals
from entering into that relationship. 6 Such challenges have been defeated because of the way in which state courts have defined the right
to marry.' In other words, the state courts addressing the issue have
held that the individual's right to marry is merely the right to enter a
heterosexual relationship.' A homosexual who wishes to marry another homosexual has no right that can be exercised or protected.
In the light of these state opinions, it is apparent that the right to
marry is based upon the marital relationship itself. It is the purpose of
this comment to explore the nature of that relationship, and in so doing
attempt to discover the parameters of the right to enter into that relationship. It is suggested that it is the intimate, lifelong commitment
between two people9 which gives the marital relationship its special
and protected status. Viewed in such a manner, the relationship is
therefore, that the right to marry is broader than state definitions of marriage, the Equal Rights
Amendment would have no impact on same-sex marriage prohibitions. Cf. Singer v. Hara, II
Wash. App. 247, _._, 522 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1974) (state Equal Rights Amendment creates no rights
or responsibilities, but rather merely requires that existing and future rights be equally available to
both sexes).
4. See discussion notes 93, 118 infra and accompanying text.
5. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 941 n.3. See also The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, s~pra
note 2, at 706-14.
6. Only a few state court decisions have directly addressed the validity of same-sex marriage
prohibitions. See Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974); Jones v. Hallahan,
501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appealdis.
missed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499
(1971). Cf. B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (where wife is transsexual,
but was male at the time of marriage, the marriage is void). In each of these cases, the prohibition
was upheld.
7. Thus far, the determination of the scope of the right to marry has been left to the states.
In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the freedom to marry is a
vital personal right protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 12.
More recently, the Court has stated that the right to marry is of fundamental importance to the
individual. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). Neither of these cases, however, explored the parameters of that right in relation to same-sex marriage.
8. See notes 15-28 infra and accompanying text.
9. Limiting marriage to two people has long been recognized in this country. See Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding criminal conviction of bigamy because of polygamous marriage). See also Glendon, Marriageand the Stale: The WitheringAway of Marriage,62
VA. L. REv. 663, 672-75 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Glendon] for a discussion of various forms of
simultaneous marriage in this country, some acceptable and some not.
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broad enough to encompass homosexual couples.'° It is therefore con-

tended that the freedom to marry is a right which inheres in each individual regardless of sexual preference. Furthermore, under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, state prohibitions

against same-sex marriage cannot stand unless supported by compelling state interests and effectuated by means closely tailored to reach
only those interests."

Following a brief discussion of the state court decisions that have
addressed same-sex marriage prohibitions, the marital relationship and

the permissible scope of the fundamental right to marry will be examined. Thereafter, the focus of the comment proceeds upon the basis

that the right to marry is broader than a right to merely enter into a
particular heterosexual relationship. Upon this basis, state interests in
support of exclusive marriage definitions will be explored.
II.

STATE COURT DECISIONS RESTRICTING THE RIGHT TO

MARRY

There have been but a handful of decisions in which the question

of same-sex marriage was in issue.'Z Typically, these cases arose out of
the denial of a marriage license to the applicants on the ground that
they were of the same sex.' 3 In only two of these cases did the courts
confront the constitutional issues raised by the denial of a marriage
license under these circumstances. 4 In examining these two opinions,

the limitations on the scope of the right to marry and the reasons for
the limitations become fairly apparent.
In Baker v. Nelson,"' the Minnesota Supreme Court was con-

fronted with the equal protection and due process arguments of two
10. See discussion notes 31-62 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of a legislative
solution to the question of homosexual marriage see Comment, Homosexual's Right to Marry: 4
ConstitutionalTest and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979).
11. This was the equal protection analysis applied by the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. at 388, invalidating a Wisconsin support statute which significantly interfered with the decision to marry. See notes 70-78 infra and accompanying text.
12. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (two women applied for and were
denied a marriage license). But ef. B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(license was issued but marriage was subsequently held void).
14. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appealdismissed,409 U.S. 810
(1972); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). In Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973), however, the court expressly declined to address the constitutional issues.
Id. at 590. The court simply stated that the relationship proposed by the women was not a marriage. Id. at 589.
15. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
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males who were denied a marriage license. In construing the statute,' 76
the court found an implicit prohibition against same-sex marriages.'
the statute violated no
Moreover, the court found that, as construed,
8
constitutional rights of the petitioners.'
The court reached this result because it determined that the right
to marry was a right only to enter into a heterosexual relationship. It
was the court's belief that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment was not a charter for restructuring the historic and deeprooted concept of the marital relationship.' 9 In other words, marriage,
"as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation
and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis."2 The court did not perceive the right to marry as changing this
concept of the marital institution.2
16. The applicable statute, MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (1969) made no reference to the required sex of the applicants.
Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties, capable in law of contracting, is essential. Lawful marriage hereafter
may be contracted only when a license has been obtained therefor as provided by law
and when such marriage is contracted in the presence of two witnesses and solemnized
by one authorized, or whom the parties in good faith believe to be authorized, so to do.
Id.
17. The court found such a limitation based upon the "common usage" of the word marriage
as a union between one man and one woman. 291 Minn. at , 191 N.W.2d at 185-86 & n.l.
18. Id. at , 191 N.W.2d at 186. The court was not persuaded that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties was a fundamental right of all persons. Apparently, the court
viewed the right as one inhering in the heterosexual "couple" and not in the individual. See Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In addition to finding that the right to marry did not encompass the relationship sought
by the petitioners, the court also found that the state classification of marriage did not violate the
equal protection clause. Id. at_., 191 N.W.2d at 187. The petitioners had argued that if the state
purpose served by the classification of marriage as a union of a man and a woman was in promoting procreation, the statute was unconstitutional because it was not rationally related to that purpose. The petitioner's basis for this argument was that not all heterosexuals are capable of bearing
or willing to bear children, yet they are permitted to marry while homosexuals are not. The
court's answer to this contention was that the Constitution does not require abstract symmetry.
Id.
The court's concise response is supported by the traditional equal protection analysis applied
to classifications which neither impinge a fundamental interest nor affect a suspect class. San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (to satisfy equal protection it must be
determined that the legislative scheme rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and, therefore, does not constitute an invidious discrimination). See also F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (the classification must be reasonable and bear
some fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation such that persons similarly
situated are treated alike). While it might be theoretically desirable to have a perfect fit between
the state purpose and the means used to achieve that purpose, many courts have been willing to
tolerate both overinclusive and underinclusive classifications in recognition of the practical difficulties of achieving such perfection. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949). See generallyTussman and tenBroek, The EqualProlectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). For an extensive discussion of the intricacies involved in the rational
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Three years later, in Singer v. Hara,22 the Washington Supreme
Court also addressed the issue of same-sex marriage prohibitions. Predictably, the court rejected the constitutional challenges of two men
who were denied a marriage license.2 3 As in Baker, the Washington
court construed the silent state marriage statute as permitting a marriage only between persons of opposite sex.24
Although the Singer decision is by far the most reasoned discussion of the equal protection issues raised by same-sex marriage prohibitions, the court simply declared that the right sought by the appellants
did not exist for them.25 The court found that this resulted from the
nature of marriage itself and its recognized definition as a union between one man and one woman.2 6 Relying upon the language enunciated in the Baker opinion, 27 the Washington court justified this concept
of marriage upon the historic purpose of marriage28as involving procreation and the rearing of children within a family.
While it has been established that the freedom to marry is a vital
personal right protected by the due process clause29 and that the decision to marry is of fundamental importance to the individual,3" the
state courts have built a condition into the exercise of the right. Thus,
while there is a right to marry, the condition tied to that right is entry
into a heterosexual relationship. The right cannot be viewed apart
basis test used in equal protection analysis, see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076-87 (1969).
22. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
23. In addition to arguing that the prohibition against same-sex marriage violated the eighth,
ninth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, the appellants also argued
that such prohibitions violated the Equal Rights Amendment to the Washington Constitution.
WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1. In disposing of the Equal Rights Amendment issue the court stated
that the prohibitions did not deny the appellants entry into marriage on the basis of their sex, but
rather, denial was based on the nature of marriage itself. 11 Wash. App. at , 522 P.2d at 1192.
See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
24. The applicable statute provides:
Marriage is a civil contract which may be entered into by persons of the age of eighteen
years, who are otherwise capable: Provided,That every marriage entered into in which
either party shall not have attained the age of seventeen years shall be void except where
this section has been waived by a superior court judge of the county in which the female
resides on a showing of necessity.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (Supp. 1979) (as amended 1970). The court found significance in the reference to "female" in the proviso of the statute as well as the reference to male and
female in other statutes. The court noted that these statutory references indicated a legislative
intent to prohibit same-sex marriages. 11 Wash. App. at , 522 P.2d at 1189 & n.3.
25. Id. at , 522 P.2d at 1192.
26. Id. at , 522 P.2d at 1192, 1196.
27. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
28. 11 Wash. App. at ., 522 P.2d at 1197.
29. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
30. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
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from the nature of the marital relationship itself. To determine the
scope of the right to marry, it is necessary to discuss the characteristics
and purposes of the relationship.
III.

EVOLVING CONCEPTs OF THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP

The word marriage may mean different things to different people,
but it is capable of at least two distinct meanings. Marriage has been
viewed as a civil contract between two people.-" As a contract, the
union must be voluntarily entered into; therefore, each party must be
capable of consenting to the contract. 32 If this were the only meaning
attributable to marriage, then there would appear to be no obstacle to
homosexual individuals to enter the marriage contract as long as they
are capable of contracting and have consented to the contract. 33 Marriage, however, is capable of another meaning as well: that of a particular kind of relationship or legal status that exists between two people.
The relationship has traditionally been viewed as existing between one
man and one woman.34 Yet, this characterization of the marital union
says nothing about the relationship itself and gives no clue as to why
this relationship stands apart from other male-female relationships.
It has been stated by one sociologist that the institution of marriage probably
developed out of a primeval habit. It was,

..

even in primi-

tive times, the habit of a man and a woman (or several women) to live together, to have sexual relations with one
another, and to rear their offspring in common, the man being
the protector and supporter of his family and the woman being his helpmate and the nurse of their children. This habit
was sanctioned by custom, and afterwards by law, and was
thus transformed into a societal institution.35
It has been further observed that the origin of the "habit" of extended
cohabitation between men and women is rooted in the instincts of the
human animal. By comparing various human cultures and comparing
human beings to other species, it has been proposed that the origin of
the habit lies in: the instinct to preserve the next generation and, there31. See G.

MAY, MARRIAGE LAWS AND DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1929).

32. Id. at 8.

33. An argument based upon the contractual nature of marriage was made by the petitioners
in Singer and was rejected by the court. Singer v. Hara, I1 Wash. App. 247,
1189 (1974).

,

522 P.2d 1187,

34. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
35. E. WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE 27-28 (1921).
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fore, the species; 3 6 the instinct to care and provide for defenseless offspring;37 and the instinct to remain with a partner who has been the
source of sexual pleasure even after the sexual relations have ceased.38
It was this habit which evolved into custom and which, in turn, resulted
in the social institution of marriage.39
A number of characteristics of the marital relationship are revealed in this account of the origins of marriage. It recognizes that
marriage is the union of two people for mutual help, protection, and
companionship. It is living together, for an extended period of time
and involves sexual relations as well as the raising of any children born
to the couple. On the other hand, while this account of the origin of
marriage recognizes sexual pleasure as an element of intimate relations
between the couple, the major purpose for sexual relations under this
hypothesis is the instinctive purpose of preserving the species.40 Further, not only are marriage and family intrinsically connected to one
another, but it has been proffered that marriage is but an offshoot of
family. 4 ' Under this reasoning, marriage would be quite a different
relationship for people who are incapable of producing children or who
are resolved not to bear children.
36. Id. at 35. See also L. STOCKTON, MARRIAGE CONSIDERED FROM LEGAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL VIEWPOINTS 19 (1912).
37. Id. at 72.
38. Id. at 70.
39. Id. at 69-70.
40. The belief that natural and normal sexual relations between human beings is that which
results in procreation is also embodied in modem criminal statutes which prohibit certain sexual
contacts. See notes 90-95 infra and accompanying text. State attempts to criminalize the consensual activities of adults are tied to widespread religious beliefs that any sexual act not leading to
procreation is sinful. See United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (dicta).
See also note 57 infra and accompanying text. Religious dogma, however, is not the only basis for
the belief that normal sexual activity is that which would result in procreation. In the context of
infra-human mammals, Alfred Kinsey has observed:
The impression that infra-human mammals more or less confine themselves to heterosexual activities is a distortion of the fact which appears to have originated in a manmade philosophy, rather than in specific observations of mammalian behavior. Biologists and psychologists who have accepted the doctrine that the only natural function of
sex is reproduction, have simply ignored the existence of sexual activity which is not
reproductive. They have assumed that heterosexual responses are a part of an animal's
innate, "instinctive" equi ment, and that all other types of sexual activity represent "perversions" of the "normal instincts." Such interpretations are, however, mystical.
A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 448 (1953). As further noted by Kinsey, "sexual contacts between individuals of the same
sex are known to occur in practically every species of mammal which has been extensively studied." Id.
41. E. WESTERMARCK, supra note 35, at 72. See also S. KNOX, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW
25 (1941), wherein the authors argue that people marry not out of love or out of an instinct to
perpetuate the human race, but rather out of a need to live in a family.
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The concept of marriage as a relationship deriving its primary
function from the propagation of children and the constitution of a
family has not been confined to the observations of sociologists. Writing for a majority of the United States Supreme Court in 1888, Mr.
Justice Field observed that marriage "is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of family and of society .... The viewpoint that marriage derives its fundamental character from procreation and the raising of children within the family has often been expressed by the Court
since 1888.43 It was this characterization of marriage that led the state
courts to hold that the right to marry is limited to heterosexual marriage. 4
It cannot be doubted that many people who marry do bear children.45 On the other hand, it is not uncommon for young married
couples to choose to remain childless. 46 Nor is it unusual for older persons beyond the age of childbearing to marry. Such occurrences indicate a contemporary concept of marriage beyond mere procreation and
the raising of children within the traditional family setting.47 This contemporary concept of marriage is also revealed by recent Supreme
Court decisions concerning the individual's decision to bear children.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,'4 a majority of the Supreme Court
struck down a state statute that attempted to prohibit the use of contraceptives by married couples. The Court determined that the law had a
maximum destructive impact upon the marital relationship-a relationship lying within the zone of privacy protected by various, explicit
guarantees of the Constitution.49
*4'

42. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
43. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is fundamental to our very
existence and survival).
44. This section does not address the possible and permissible interests a state may assert in
justification of its marriage definition. Those interests and the means used to justify them will be
examined at notes 81-118 infra and accompanying text. This section is concerned only with a
concept of marriage that exists apart from state definitions of that relationship.
45. Marriage and the raising of a family within a traditional family unit continues to be a
cornerstone of societal and political institutions in this country. See Heymann & Barzeley, The
Forestand the Trees- Roe v. Wade and its
Critics,53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 772-74 (1973).
46. Approximately five percent of married couples between the ages of twenty and thirty
choose not to bear children. PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 1979, at 30.
47. TIME, March 5, 1979, at 42, wherein it is observed that large segments of the American
populace no longer consider children to be an inevitable or necessary part of marriage.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. The specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights had previously been construed to include
certain unarticulated rights. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(first and fourteenth amendments protect the right of a parent to educate his child as he chooses);
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While the immediate concern of the Court in Griswold was with

the privacy rights surrounding the marital relationship, the opinion is
also important for what it indicates about contemporary concepts of
marriage. The nature of the case itself indicates that not all people who

marry and are capable of bearing children wish to do so. Moreover,
the use of contraceptives by married people suggests that while the
couple may decide to bear children, they have chosen to limit the
number of children they will produce. These are not particularly startling revelations. If, however, it is argued that marriage attains its fundamental character solely because of procreation and the raising of
children, it must be questioned why people who cannot or will not fulfill these purposes enter into marriage or why married couples would
attempt to limit the size of their families. The evident answer, and the

one apparently endorsed by the Court,5 ° is that the marital relationship
involves much more than the bearing and raising of children. In other

words, the decision whether to bear children is but one aspect of the
marital relationship."
The Griswold opinion is also enlightening because of the Court's
observation with respect to the nature of marriage. The Court stated:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopeMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (first and fourteenth amendments protect the right
to learn the German language in private school). The Griswoldopinion, however, expressly recognized "[t]hat specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of
privacy." 381 U.S. at 484. The Court found that within this constitutionally protected zone of
privacy is the marital relationship and the married couple's decision concerning procreation. Id.
at 485.
50. Id. at 482. The Court noted that "[t]his law. . . operates directly on an intimate relation
of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation." Id. (emphasis
added).
51. It should be observed that the decision to bear children is not confined merely to married
persons. This is made clear by the Court's decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
which involved an equal protection challenge to a Massachusetts penal statute which prohibited
the sale or giving away of contraceptives by anyone other than certain specified individuals. Id. at
441 n.2. Moreover, only married persons could receive articles and information pertaining to
contraception. Id. While the Court's decision rested upon the equal protection clause, its discussion of the privacy right involved is illuminating. The Court stated:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(state may not impose a blanket provision requiring parental consent for abortion of an unmarried
minor); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy protects a woman's decision to have an
abortion).
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fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.5 2
Above all else, marriage is two people living, working, and loving
together.5 3 It is the public and voluntary commitment 4 of one individual to spend a lifetime with another.55 If children are born, they are
born as a result of this deep emotional bond between the spouses. If no
children are born, the bond nevertheless remains.
Undoubtedly most people who have given thought to the special
nature of the marital relationship would not disagree with the conclusions reached thus far. Yet, most people would also strongly argue that
underlying this concept of marriage is the existence of a relationship
between a man and a woman. 6 To contend that this belief has not
been the traditional perception of marriage would be foolhardy. On
the other hand, homosexuals have endured a long history of discrimination, hatred and misunderstanding. 7 In considering this history, it is
52. 381 U.S. at 486.
53. In discussing the opposite side of the marital relationship, the termination of the relationship, one commentator has noted:
The meaning of marriage has undergone profound changes in the last few generations. . . . Husband and wife, often uprooted from their home communities, are facing

each other in isolation as never before. . . . True, legal partnership is the goal, with a
highly personal bond, "a commitment in depth and complexity," between the spouses.
Bodeneimer, Reflections on the Futureof GroundsforDivorce, 8 J. FAM. L. 179, 189 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 190. The commitment is a public one, for upon entering the legal marital relationship the parties bind themselves to the responsibilities and obligations to each other imposed by
the state. See generally Glendon, supra note 9. See also Comment, ConstitutionalAspects ofthe
Homosexual'sRight to a MarriageLicense, 12 J. FAM. L. 607, 622-24 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited
as Right to a MarriageLicense].
55. It has been stated that there is disagreement in the homosexual community as to why
some homosexuals desire to marry. Glendon, supra note 9, at 677 n.60. Some homosexuals have
declared that their reason for marriage is to acquire the benefits received by other married
couples. Id. While it may be true that some individuals marry in order to obtain the benefits of
that status, it is also true that those entering the relationship are saddled with the same obligations
imposed on other married couples. See Right to a Marriage License, supra note 54, at 622-24.
Moreover, an individual's motivation to enter the marital relationship should not detract from the
concep.t of marriage itself.
56 See notes 19, 20, & 24 supra and accompanying text.
57. The condemnation of homosexual acts dates from at least biblical times. See Leviticus
18:22, 20:13; Romans 1:27; 1 Corinthians6:9. It has been argued that this condemnation is based
upon an erroneous assumption that the ancient cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed by
Divine judgment because of the prevalence in those cities of homosexual activity. D. BAILEY,
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 1-28 (1955). Repugnance to homosexual acts has also been embodied in criminal statutes which punish both private and public
homosexual conduct through torture, death, or castration. Id. at 148-52. See also The Homosex-
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not surprising that only heterosexuals have openly lived with one another and that laws have been developed to protect these relationships.
Moreover, the belief that homosexual couples cannot share as intimate
an emotional and sexual relationship as do heterosexuals is
illfounded.58 While, therefore, marriage has been confined to heterosexuals, this traditional and historic perception of marriage should not
prevent its existence in alternative forms in the future.5 9
The concept of marriage as a permanent, monogamous union of a
man and a woman for the purposes of procreation and the raising of
children within a family unit is a concept deeply embedded in the polit-

ical, religious, and social systems of this country. This point cannot be
overlooked. Yet, as has been seen, contemporary attitudes toward the
marital relationship have changed and are continuing to change. Marriage is not a permanent relationship for many people, nor is it of necessity the exclusive domain of the family.60 Moreover, in those states

in which the penal sanctions levied against the sexual conduct of consenting adults have been removed, marriage cannot even be viewed as

the only legal avenue of cohabitation and sexual intimacy between
ual's Legal Dilemma, supra note 2, at 688-90. While present legal.sanctions are not as severe as
those in times past, many states still punish private, consensual homosexual conduct. See note 98
infra and accompanying text. In addition to the threat of prosecution, homosexuals face public
harassment and humiliation, the loss of employment, as well as the loss of custody or termination
of parental rights. See generally V. Myers, Sexual Preference Study: Community Relations Commission-City of Tulsa, Oklahoma (1976); Comment, The Law and the ProblemParent: Custody
and ParentalRights of Homosexual, Mentally Retarded,Mentally Ill andIncarceratedParents, 16
J. FAM. L. 797 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Problem Parent].
58. One author has noted that the word homosexuality
implies love for a person of the same sex, and is part and parcel of the whole concept of
sensations, feelings and emotions for which the word love is the symbol.
Homosexuality is, in fact, an emotional disposition which leads to close and intimate
contact between people of the same sex, a contact which may or may not be expressed
sexually.
C. WOLFF, LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN 11-12 (1971) (emphasis in original). While it might be popularly thought that homosexuality is nothing more than perverse sexual satisfaction, the fact remains that homosexuals are human beings with human feelings. Moreover, if homosexual
relationships are at present unstable, this instability is more likely the result of social and legal
pressure imposed upon the couple rather than an inherent inability of two people of the same sex
to live together. Cf. Private Homosexual Conduct, supra note 1, at 1632-33, wherein the author
argues that the promiscuity among homosexuals and the high incidence of venereal disease among
homosexuals is a result of criminal laws that prohibit homosexual acts.
59. Cf Glendon, supra note 9, at 672-75; Right to a MarriageLicense, supra note 54, at 619
n.46, wherein the authors discuss the viability of alternative forms of marriage.
60. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) wherein the Court struck down
as constitutionally infirm an ordinance that impinged on the familial living arrangements of related individuals. The Court clearly recognized the diversified family living arrangements in
modem American society, particularly among the poor. Id. at 504-06. See generally Glendon,
supra note 9.
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adults. 6 1 In other words, while marriage is a viable institution, the relationship should not continue to be viewed in terms that no longer have
significance. The marital relationship, in contemporary terms, embodies many purposes. It is a voluntary public commitment of two people
to accept certain socially imposed obligations toward each other. It
contemplates living together for some period of time. It involves sexual
relations and the possibility of the birth or adoption of children. Yet,
above all else, the bond of the relationship is the mutual love and respect each of the partners has for the other. Viewed in these terms,
including the possible existence of children,62 the marital relationship is
broader than its accepted definition might indicate and is flexible
enough to encompass adult partners of the same sex.
IV.

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE EXPANDED RIGHT TO MARRY

One commentator has noted that "[tihe right to choose one's
spouse is complimentary to the right to marry."63 Yet, even if the concept of marriage is broad enough to include homosexual relationships,
and even if the right to marry encompasses the right to enter same-sex
marriages, a state could still attempt to restrict an individual's choice of
a spouse to a person of the opposite sex.' To come within the requirements of equal protection, however, the burden is upon the state to
justify any direct interference with the exercise of a fundamental
65

right.

A.

The Standardof Review

As discussed earlier, the state courts that have considered the issue
of same-sex marriage have applied the deferential rational basis test to
state statutes classifying marriage as a union between persons of the
opposite sex.6 6 In light of the limited scope these courts have attributed
67
to the right to marry, this deferential scrutiny was not incorrect.
61. See discussion notes 110-114 infra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 88-89 infra and accompanying text.
63. Glendon, supra note 9, at 672.

64. Cf.Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy protects the decision to have an
abortion but at some point during the pregnancy, the state's interest becomes compelling enough
to interfere with that decision).
65. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). See generall, Derelopmentsin the Law-Equal
Protection,82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
66. See notes 15-22 supra and accompanying text.

67. But see The Legality ofHomosexualMarrage,supra note 3, at 574-83, wherein the author
argues that the rational basis test used in equal protection analysis should not be applied to the
question of same sex marriage because the interests involved are more than purely economic in
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When a court is faced with a classification which affects a fundamental

interest, 6869 however, deference must give way to heightened judicial
scrutiny.

The Court, in Zablocki v. Redhail,7° was faced with an equal protection challenge to a Wisconsin support statute which prohibited persons from marrying without court approval if those persons were
obligated to support minor children not in their custody. 7' The approval order would not be granted unless the applicant could prove
compliance with the state support obligation laws. 2 Moreover, it had
to be shown that the child would not become a public charge.73 Failure
74
to comply with the statutory scheme rendered the marriage a nullity.
The majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Marshall, reaffirmed the
nature. The author argues that the proper standard of review is the analysis applied by Mr. Justice Marshall dissenting in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Under this standard
"concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they
do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification." Id. at 520-21
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The author of the note concludes that not even this equal protection
analysis would ensure homosexuals of a right to marry. Legality ofHomosexual Marriage,supra
note 3, at 582-83. The application of this analysis would require, however, a closer examination of
all the interests involved in the issue of same sex marriage rather than merely deferring to the
unexplained wisdom of the state legislature.
68. A stricter judicial scrutiny is also applied where a state classification affects a suspect
class, such as race. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). In Matthews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 497 (1976), the Court, in speaking about the legal status of illegitimacy, identified some of the
characteristics of a suspect class. One such criteria is the possession of a characteristic determined
by causes not within the control of the individual, and which bears no relation to the individual's
ability to participate in and contribute to society. Id. at 505. Other criteria have also been formulated: groups that are the victims of hostile myths and stereotypes, groups with little or no voice in
the political process, and groups that are historically discriminated against. See Right to a MarriageLicense, supra note 54, at 611-15. While homosexuals have not been regardedas a suspect
class, a convincing argument has been made that these criteria are applicable to homosexuals. See
generally id. at 615-18; Private Homosexual Conduct, supra note I, at 1625-27. See also TEIE,
supra note 1, at 944 n.17.
69. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state poll tax which
burdens fundamental right to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized). See generally
Developments in the Law-EqualProtection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1087-1120 (1969).
70. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
71. Wis. STAT. § 245.10 (1973) provided in part:
(1) No Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under
obligation to support by any court order or judgment, may marry in this state or elsewhere, without the order of the court of this state which granted such order or support
order, or the court having divorce jurisdiction in the county of this state where such
minor issue resides or where the marriage license application is made. No marriage
license shall be issued to any such person except upon court order.
Id. § 245.10(1) (1973). Section 245.10(5) of the statute provided that the statute would have extraterritorial effect. Section 245.10 was repealed by 1977 Wisc. Laws, c. 418, § 747c.
72. Id. § 245.10(1) (1973).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 245.10(5) (1973). Wis. STAT. § 245.30(l)(f) provided criminal sanctions for violation of § 245.10. Section 245.30(l)( 0 was repealed by 1977 Wise. Laws, c. 418, § 747c.
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Court's earlier decisions establishing the right to marry as a liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 75 After
explicitly characterizing the decision to marry as a right of fundamental
importance,7 6 the Court determined that any state classification which
significantly interferes with the exercise of that right cannot be upheld
unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate those interests. 77 The Wisconsin statute,
by prohibiting a class of Wisconsin residents from marrying in the absence of
a court order, directly infringed the exercise of a fundamental
8

right.

7

The Zablocki decision is significant in the context of same-sex
marriage for two important reasons. First, it establishes that for equal
protection purposes, the decision to marry is of fundamental importance. State statutes which directly impinge the exercise of that right
will be subjected to criticial judicial scrutiny. 79 State marital definitions which exclude homosexual marriages directly interfere with the
decision to marry; because these statutes affect the exercise of a fundamental right, they too should be subjected to critical examination. Second, the opinion speaks in terms of the individual and of the
importance this personal decision holds for the individual. In the light
of the Zablocki decision, it appears that future equal protection challenges to state marriage definitions will have to involve close and careful examination of the interests and the means profferred by the states
in support of those definitions.
B.

The State Interests

Two state interests have been identified in support of classifica75. 434 U.S. at 383-87.
76. Id. at 383.
77. Id. at 388.
78. The interests advanced by the state in support of the classification were that "the permission-to-marry proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the necessity of
fulfilling his prior support obligations; and the welfare of the out-of-custody children is protected." .d. The Court determined that even if these interests were legitimate and substantial, the
means used to achieve those interests unnecessarily impinged the right to marry. Id. The Court
found that the statute neither required nor provided for counseling and the classification, therefore, could not be seen as ensuring the counseling interest advanced by the state. Id. at 388-89.
Further, insofar as indigent applicants were concerned, the statute merely restricted their right to
marry without delivering any money to the applicant's children. Moreover, the Court noted that
numerous other alternatives were open to the state to exact compliance with its support obligations. Id. at 389-90.
79. The Court noted that reasonable regulations which do not significantly interfere with the
decision to marry are permissible. Only a direct interference with the right to marry is constitutionally forbidden. Id. at 386.
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tions of marriage which restrict the relationship to heterosexuals. The
first of these involves the historic societal concern with the continuance
of the human race.8 0 The state's interest in promoting procreation has
been held to be legitimate, 8' and, in some circumstances, may even be
compelling. 2 The second interest, the societal interest in assuring a

favorable environment for the growth of children,83 is dependent upon
the first because it assumes the birth of children. This interest is undoubtedly based upon a public policy consideration that a child's emotional and moral well-being is best protected by a heterosexual family
unit.8 4 It thus appears that both of these interests are sufficiently im-

portant to justify the exclusion of homosexuals from the marital relationship. The question remains, however, whether such an exclusion is
closely tailored to achieve these state interests.
While there is a correlation between present definitions of marriage and state interests in procreation, the fact remains that no state

requires, as a condition to marriage, a couple to promise to bear children once the relationship is established.85 Moreover, as long as the
couple is heterosexual, states do not prohibit sterile people from marrying even though these people cannot fulfill the state's purported interest.8 6 In other words, heterosexual marriage classifications do not, of
80. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). "Marriage is ... fundamental to our
very existence and survival." Id. at 12.
81. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court held that a state scheme that paid medical benefits to indigent women for the costs of child birth or therapeutic abortions but not for
nontherapeutic abortions did not violate the equal protection clause. While recognizing the protected right of a woman to elect to have an abortion, the Court found "a basic difference between
direct interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy." Id. at 475. In upholding the medical aid program, the Court
stated that "Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. . . .The State unquestionably has a 'strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth,' an interest honored over the centuries." Id. at 478. (footnotes omitted).
82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
83. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. at - 522 P.2d at 1197.
84. Id. The state interest in producing a certain type of environment for the growth of children is frequently expressed in custody disputes. See, e.g., Brim v. Brim, 532 P.2d 1403 (Okla.
1975). In custody battles in which one of the parents is a homosexual, courts frequently find that
the best interests of the child are not served in an environment in which homosexuality is the
norm. See generallyProblem Parent,supra note 57.
85. Even if a state should attempt to require such a precondition to marriage, the constitutionality of such a law is in doubt. See notes 101-104 infra and accompanying text. In Singer v.
Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974), the court expressly recognized that the state could
neither force married people to bear children nor even to engage in sexual relations. Id. at , 522
P.2d at 1197.
86. See, e.g., OKLA.STAT. tit. 43, § 3 (Supp. 1978) which provides in part: "Any unmarried
person of the age of eighteen (18) years or upwards and not otherwise disqualified is capable of
contracting and consenting to marriage with a person of the opposite sex... " There is no
requirement that the person of the opposite sex be capable of bearing children.
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necessity, relate to the state interest in procreation. The means used by
the state in achieving its interest are too broad to justify impinging the
exercise of the right to marry by homosexuals. Under the criteria set
forth in Zablocki, present state definitions of marriage deny homosexuals equal protection.
Similarly, it appears that the means employed by the states-exclusion of homosexuals from marriage-is broader than necessary to
achieve the state's interests in providing a protective environment for
children. At present, there is no danger that two people of the same
sex, by their union,87 could produce a child. Further, a state could restrict the adoption of children by homosexuals. 8 This would ensure
87. There is, of course, the very real possibility that a homosexual, who has or wants custody
of his or her child, may wish to marry. Courts have held that the homosexual activities of a parent
are relevant to the question of the child's best interests. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Black, 2 Fam. L.
Rep. 2593 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland Cty., June 14, 1976); A. v. A., 15 Ore. App. 353, 514 P.2d
358 (1973). Some courts are willing to allow a homosexual parent to gain or retain custody of a
child who is otherwise well adjusted; however, the courts put drastic limitations on the custodial
parent's homosexual activities and relationships. Cf. Townend v. Townend, I Fam. L. Rep. 2830
(Ohio C.P. Portage Cty., March 14, 1975) (custody awarded to non-petitioning grandparents
where lesbian mother was involved in a homosexual relationship). Should a homosexual parent
choose to enter a same-sex marriage, it is not likely that courts would find that a home in which
homosexuality is the norm is in the best interests of the child. But see People v. Brown, 49 Mich.
App. 35, 212 N.W.2d 55 (1973) (evidence did not warrant the finding that two women who lived
together in a homosexual relationship rendered their home unfit for their children).
If the state's true interest in limiting marriage to heterosexuals is to provide a certain environment for children, the custody cases illustrate alternative means available to the state for the
achievement of that end. Clearly, terminating custody is a more effective and more closely tailored means of confining children to heterosexual parents than is denying a marriage to all homosexuals. Whether this alternative is, in itself, a desirable one, is beyond the focus of this comment.
See generallyProblem Parent,supra note 57, at 799-802.
88. Section 60.3 of the Oklahoma Uniform Adoption Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60 et seq.,
sets forth the persons eligible to adopt. At first glance, this section could be read to include homosexuals whether single or married. Moreover, in In re Del Moral Rodriguez, 552 P.2d 397 (Okla.
1976), the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that there is "no distinction between the right of
procreation of children and the adoption of children." Id. at 399. The Oklahoma court, however,
was not confronted with the issue of the suitability of the adoptive parent. Id. at 400. It has been
noted that:
The mere fact that an adoptive couple meets the statutory requirements does not assure
their acceptance as adoptive parents. In determining adoptive suitability, child welfare
agencies give consideration to a wide variety of social factors. These are reflections of
value judgments that may or may not be the consensus of the wider community. Of
these, race and religion are perhaps the most important, although others such as ethnic
background, age, social position, income, and general life style are also considered ....
S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY BREAKDOWN 123 (1971) (footnotes omitted). If in considering the best interests of the child the state determines that only
heterosexual individuals can best meet the needs of the child, the state could restrict adoption to
heterosexuals. As was discussed in the context of custody disputes, courts have been willing to
consider a parent's homosexuality in determining the optimal environment in which a child
should be raised. See note 88 supra. In the light of these decisions, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that where strangers to a child have openly displayed their homosexuality by entering a
same-sex marriage, a court or agency would find them to be unsuitable adoptive parents. Again,
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the state's interest in the child's environment without interfering with
the right to marry. In short, the state interest in providing a protective
environment for children is contingent upon the existence of a child.
Excluding homosexuals from marriage, whether a child exists or is
likely to exist, sweeps too broadly.8 9
Although there is difficulty in upholding heterosexual marriage
classifications on the basis of the state's interest in the rearing and protection of children, there remains an additional state interest that requires examination.9" It could be argued that state definitions of
marriage are supported by the state's "undeniable interest in ensuring
that its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held values of its
people." 91 In other words, a state could argue that it restricts marriage
to heterosexuals because, if it permitted homosexuals to marry, the
state could be condoning activity that it punishes through its criminal
sodomy statutes. It could be argued that the societal value judgment as
to the propriety of homosexual conduct is embodied within such statutes.
State statutes regulating the sexual conduct between consenting
adults take numerous forms. 92 Some states prohibit oral and anal copulation,93 with consent being neither an element of nor a defense to the
crime. 94 Many other states simply prohibit the "detestable and abomiwhile such a result may be unacceptable, it is a more effective and less restrictive means of achieving the state's interest in a child's welfare.
89. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. None of the state courts addressing the question of same-sex marriage discussed other
interests which might support state definitions of marriage. The Singer court was confident that
other important interests existed, but the court did not feel compelled to explore what those interests were. 11 Wash. App. at _, 522 P.2d at 1197.
91. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Mr.
Justice Powell observed:
State regulation has included bans on incest, bigamy, and homosexuality, as well as various preconditions to marriage, such as blood tests. Likewise, a showifig of fault on the
part of one of the partners traditionally has been a prerequisite to the dissolution of an
unsuccessful union. A "compelling state purpose" inquiry would cast doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce.
Id. at 399. Not only does Justice Powell's statement make clear his dissatisfaction with the strict
standard of review announced by the majority, but it also appears to recognize that bans on homosexual marriage could be attacked under such a standard.
92. This discussion is limited to private and consensual sexual activities between adults. It
should be noted, however, that state sodomy statutes also regulate sexual conduct between adults
and minors, as well as penalize non-consensual activity.
93. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293, as amended (1977): "Subdivision 1. Definitions.
'Sodomy' means carnally knowing any person by the anus or by or with the mouth."
94. MINN. STAT. ArN. § 609.293(5), as amended (1977). See also Gooch v. State, 31 Md.
App. 331, 367 A.2d 90 (1977) (whether the act is voluntary or involuntary is immaterial).
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nable crime against nature, ' 95 which presumably regulates more than
sodomy.96 A few states specifically punish the sexual activities of consenting adults who are of the same sex.97 With the exception of these
latter state statutes, most statutes which prohibit all sexual conduct
other than penile-vaginal intercourse apply to both homosexual and
heterosexual activity. 98 Moreover, many of these statutes make no express exception for married couples.99 It is no small wonder, therefore,
that such statutes have been assailed as impermissibly impinging the
right of privacy held by consenting adults.
As of yet, the Supreme Court has not determined whether the due
process right of privacy encompasses a right of sexual privacy." With
95. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 886. This section, entitled Crime Against Nature, provides: "Every person who is guilty of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with mankind or with a beast, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not
exceeding ten years." Id. Although the language of this type of statute is inflammatory and
vague, the Supreme Court has held that these statutes are valid. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48,
rev'pker curiam,514 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1975) (Tennessee crimes against nature statute not constitutionally void for vagueness). The courts have justified the non-descript language of these statutes on the ground that the legislature was avoiding graphic sexual descriptions, State v. Lair, 62
N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973); the crime is too disgusting and well known to articulate, Horn v.
State, 49 Ala. App. 489, 273 So. 2d 249 (1973); or that the sexual behavior is such as should not be
described among Christians, Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558 (Okla. Crim. 1955). It is difficult to
comprehend the reluctance of the state legislatures and society in general to describe the intimate
sexual conduct they publicly drag into the courts. See generally Note, CriminalLaw.'AnExaminalion of the Oklahoma Laws Concerning Sexual Behavior, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 459 (1970); Note,
Sodomy Statutes: The Question of Canslitulionaliy,50 NEB. L. REv. 567 (1971).
96. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 380 P.2d 284 (Okla. Crim. 1963) (statute proscribes not only
sodomy but any other bestial act or unnatural copulation).
97. See, e..., KAN. STAT. ANN., § 21-3505 (Vernon 1971) which provides: "Sodomy is oral
or anal copulation between persons who are not husband and wife or consenting adult members
of the opposite sex ....
98. See, e.g., Gooch v. State, 34 Md. App. 331,_, 367 A.2d 90, 94 (1977); William v. State,
316 So. 2d 362, 363 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975). See generally Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney: Closing the Door to a FundamentalRight of Sexual Privacy, 53 DEN. L.J. 553 (1976).
99. In Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972), the court observed that Maryland's sodomy statute could conceivably apply to the consensual acts of a married couple, although it doubted that this would happen. id. at -, 287 A.2d at 304. See also State v. Nelson,
199 Minn. 86,..._, 271 N.W. 114,118 (1937) (dictum), overruled on other grounds, State v. Tahash,
166 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1969).
100. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977). In Carey a plurality of
the Court noted that the question of sexual privacy, with regard to consenting adults, is still open.
But see id. at 718 n.2 (Relnquist, J., dissenting) (certain consensual conduct-adult homosexual
conduct-has been determined to be within the state's regulatory authority.). Mr. Justice Rehnquist based his contention upon the Court's summary affirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth rAltorney, 425 U.S. 901, reh. den., 425 U.S. 985, aj'g, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1976). The district
court in Doe had denied the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs who contended that enforcement of Virginia's sodomy statute was unconstitutional as applied to the private and consensual conduct of adult males. The court found that the right of privacy protected
marriage, home, and family but not the private and consensual activities of homosexuals. 403 F.
Supp. at 1200-02. Accord, Heymann & Barzeley, The Forestand the Trees.- Roe v. Wade and Its

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss1/8

18

Cullem: Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage

1979]

SAME-SEX MARRIA GE

0 2
the advent of Griswold v. Connecticutl0 1 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,1
however, some courts have found a constitutionally protected right of

sexual privacy. Relying primarily upon Griswold, these courts have
found that the privacy right surrounding the marital relationship encompasses the consensual and private sexual activity of married
couples. 0 3 While most of these courts have been less willing to extend
this right to unmarried couples, 1°4 a few courts have found, that the
right is applicable to all private and consensual activities of adults.10
In those states in which a right of sexual privacy exists with respect
to married couples, the state has been held to have no interest in the
sexual decisions of the spouses in the absence of compelling reasons."°6
The fact that society, through the state, deems sodomy unnatural or
abominable is not compelling justification for intrusion into the
couple's decisions and activities. °7 It is not that sodomy is any less a
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 774 (1973) (right of privacy does not necessarily require protection of
all consensual sexual activity).
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe is of precedential value. See R. STERN &
E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 230-31 (4th ed. 1969). It has been argued, however,
that because no threat of prosecution was involved in Doe, the Court affirmed the denial of relief
because the case was not ripe for adjudication and not because there is no sexual privacy right for
all adults. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 943. See also State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333
(1977).
101. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text.
102. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
103. See, e.g., Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976);
Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
104. The distinction the courts have made between married and single people rests upon the
reverence Justice Douglas held for the marriage relationship in Griswold and the particular privacy right found in that case. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text. These courts have
not been persuaded that the due process discussion in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
extended the right of privacy developed in Griswoldto single individuals. See note 51 supra. See
State v. Lair, 62 NJ. 388 _.,301 A.2d 748, 753 (1973). See also Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349,
352 (4th Cir.) (addendum), cert. denied,429 U.S. 977 (1976). For an extensive discussion of the
existence of a sexual privacy right for heterosexuals, married or single, see Note, Fornication,Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MIcH. L. REv.252 (1978).
105. See State v. Saunders, 75 NJ. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); State v. Cuiffini, 164 N.J. Super.
145, 395 A.2d 904 (1978). See also State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975),
rev'dsub nom. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187,
539 P.2d 207 (1975), rev'd, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976).
106. For example, in Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847
(1968), the circuit court set aside the conviction of a defendant who had entered a plea of guilty to
having committed the "crime against nature" with his wife. The court, noting that there was no
claim of force, held that the state could not punish the consensual sexual activity of married
persons absent a "clear showing that the state had an interest in preventing such relations, which
outweigh the constitutional right to marital privacy." Id. at 875. The court based its conclusion
on the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold Id.
107. Cf.Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976), wherein
the court noted that whatever sexual activities in which married couples engage, within the privacy of their bedrooms, is beyond the state's scrutiny.
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crime or unnatural simply because it is undertaken by married
couples.'
Rather, it is the shield of privacy surrounding the marital
relationship which these courts have held thwarts the state's attempt to
regulate sexual intimacies between the spouses.
If a state has no legitimate interest in the consensual and private
decisions of married couples, even if that couple's decisions are contrary to societal conceptions of proper sexual conduct, prevention of
homosexual marriage upon the basis of morality loses much of its
force. It is beside the point that married homosexual couples would
engage in only sodomitical activities while heterosexual couples would
have a wider range of sexual possibilities. The point is that the marital
relationship closes the bedroom door to state intrusion, thereby protecting intimate and personal activity from the state's gaze.
The identical result would seem to be dictated in those states in
which the right of privacy shields all consensual adult sexual activity.
Both the type of sexual activity and the choice of sexual partner are not
within the state's legitimate scope of concern.' 9
The question of whether a state has a sufficiently important interest in denying homosexuals the right to marry also arises where a state
has repealed its sodomy statutes as to all consenting adults." 0 The repeal of a sodomy statute, of course, is not indicative of whether a sexual
privacy right exists. De-criminalization of private sexual conduct, how108. For example, in State v. Nelson, 199 Minn. 86, 271 N.W. 114 (1937), overruled on other

grounds, State v. Tahash, 166 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1969), the Minnesota Supreme Court observed:
It is not the normal sexual act that this [the sodomy] statute aims at. Rather and only it
is the unnatural and prohibited ways of satisfying sexual desires that the statute is
designed to punish. Thus husband and wife, if violating this statute, could undoubtedly
be punished, whereas the normal sexual act would not only be legal but perhaps entirely

proper.
State v. Nelson, 199 Minn. at., 271 N.W. at 118.
109. In State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, _, 381 A.2d 333, 339 (1977), the Supreme Court of

New Jersey determined that the right of privacy embodied the right of personal behavior and
choice. In invalidating the state's fornication statute the court said:
[T]he conduct statutorily defined as fornication involves, by its very nature, a fundamental personal choice. Thus, the statute infringes upon the right of privacy. Although persons may differ as to the propriety and morality of such conduct ...

such a decision is

necessarily encompassed in the concept of personal autonomy which our Constitution
seeks to safeguard.
Fornication may be abhorrent to the morals and deeply held beliefs of many persons.

But any appropriate "remedy" for such conduct cannot come from legislative flat.
Id. at . 381 A.2d at 342.
One year later, relying upon the reasoning of Saunders, the Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court found that the right of privacy extends to the private acts of consenting
homosexual adults. State v. Ciutffni, 164 NJ. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (1978).
110. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 772(b), (c), 766 (1974).
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ever, does indicate that the state is no longer asserting an interest in the
consensual activities of its adult citizens, whether the adults are of the
opposite or same sex.'' If a state recognizes that the private sexual
activity or preference of its citizenry is a matter of private morality, it is
difficult to justify a state definition of marriage which precludes people
of the same sex based upon a secular morality interest. The state might
argue that while it no longer criminally punishes homosexual conduct
or relationships, neither does it seek to encourage or foster such relationships by permitting same sex marriages. Yet, even if the state has a
proper interest in promoting heterosexual relationships, the state cannot achieve that interest by the direct interference with the exercise of
the fundamental right to marry. 2 It should not be sufficient to argue
that a homosexual can marry so long as he or she marries someone of
opposite sex.'" 3 The right to marry is the freedom to marry the person
of one's choice. When a fundamental right hangs in the balance, the
state should not be permitted to eliminate one choice simply because it
seeks to promote another.
A somewhat different situation arises in those few states that only
111. Hawaii, for example, has revised its criminal statutes such that only forcible sexual conduct, sexual conduct with a child, or with someone incapable of consent, and offensive conduct are
the subjects of penal sanction. HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 707-730. In the introductory comment to
Part V., Sexual Offenses, of the Hawaii Penal Code, the commentator observes that the code
"adopts the position. . . that a secular penal code should not be used to enforce purely moral or
religious standards." Id. at 360. The comment recognizes that the consensual sexual activities of
adults is an area of private morality, more properly within the concern of spiritual authorities than
within the state's sphere of concern. Id. at 361.
112. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), wherein the Court found no equal protection
offense in a state scheme that promoted childbirth but which did not eliminate a woman's decision
to have an abortion. See note 78 supra.
113. A legal analogy between homosexual marriage prohibitions and the interracial marriage
prohibitions struck down in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), could not, at present, be properly drawn. This is a result of the inherently suspect character of laws drawn on racial grounds.
See id. at 9 (fact of equal application does not remove statutes containing racial classifications
from the heavy burden imposed by the fourteenth amendment); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880). At present, homosexuals have not been considered a suspect class. See note 68
supra.
Despite this legal difference, there is great similarity between societal repugnance for interracial and same-sex marriage. This attitude is exemplified by a Virginia trial judge who, in his
disposition of the Loving case stated the following:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he [sic] placed
them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his [sic] arrangement
there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he [sic] separated the races
shows that he [sic] did not intend for the races to mix.
Quoted in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
Evidently, the purpose of antimiscegenation statutes was to preserve marriage not only as a
union between a man and a woman, but as a union between people of the same race. As the
Court's opinion in Loving made clear, however, the state could not, absent strong justification,
prevent an alternative form of marriage-interracial marriage. Id. at 12.
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make sexual activity between consenting adults of the same sex a crime.
In these states, the concern does not appear to be a societal condemna-4
tion of the type of sexual activity in which the participants engage.'
Rather, the state interest is with the participants themselves. In these
few states the immorality does not appear to be sodomy per se, but
rather sodomy practiced between individuals of the same sex. In these
states, it could be argued that state definitions of marriage which exclude homosexuals are justified by the state's interest in upholding the
moral judgment of the community as embodied in its sodomy statute.
Moreover, the exclusive marital definition is closely tailored to achieve
the morality interest.
This moral judgment is consistent with Judeo-Christian teachings
condemning homosexual activity.'1 5 It finds support in a long and well
developed history of discrimination against homosexuals." 16 Moreover,
it perpetuates the repugnance and disgust the majority of people harbor
against a minority of human beings. If the Constitution permits a state
to infringe upon the exercise of a fundamental right based upon personal religious beliefs, discrimination, and hatred, then there is no obstacle to a definition of marriage that excludes homosexuals in these
states. Endorsing such a conclusion, however, undermines the security
of a constitutionally protected right. Past attempts by states to restrict
the freedom to marry based upon deeply held discriminatory beliefs
have been thwarted by the courts, 7 and the burden has been upon the
states to justify their restrictions. The burden of justification should be
no less severe in the context of same-sex marriage prohibitions.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the right to marry is a fundamental right inhering in
the individual. It is a right relying heavily upon individual personal
choice. While the freedom to marry is essential to the individual, the
state courts defining the right have made it a conditional one, The
114. The Kansas statute, for example, on its face, recognizes that sodomitical activity can be
practiced by heterosexuals-married or single. See note 98 supra and accompanying text. Kansas, however, chooses only to punish all homosexual conduct.
115. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
116. Discrimination against homosexuals is perhaps clearest in the area of employment. See,
eg, Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977), cerl. denied,

434 U.S. 879 (1978) (upholding school board's decision to discharge teacher as "immoral" on the

basis of the teacher's homosexuality). See generally The Homosexuals LegalDilemma, supra note

2.
117. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); note 114 supra and accompanying text.
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right to marry has been interpreted by these courts to be the freedom
merely to enter a heterosexual union. This interpretation of the right is
founded upon traditional perceptions of the marital relationship itself.
While tradition supports this interpretation of the right, much of
the basis of the tradition itself is changing. Marriage is no longer the
exclusive domain for the bearing and raising of children. Moreover,
many people do not view the purpose of marriage to be the bearing of
children. Further, in many states marriage is no longer the only legal
avenue of cohabitation and sexual intimacy between adults. Finally,
marriage is being viewed as an equal partnership between two adults,
instead of a relationship wherein one spouse, the husband, has the sole
duty to support and rule his household. These changes in the concept
of the marital relationship and its purposes affect traditional perspectives of that institution. In contemporary terms, marriage is the voluntary and public commitment of two people to live together under
certain legally imposed obligations to each other. It is a relationship
built on love, trust, and companionship. It is a particular familial relationship which may or may not include children. It is a highly personal
union of two people which transcends bias and prejudice. Viewed in
such a manner the relationship is flexible enough to include homosexual partners. The individual's fundamental right to enter the marital
relationship, therefore, is broad enough to encompass same-sex marriage.
Modem domestic relations statutes, either specifically or through
state court interpretation, define marriage as a union between a man
and a woman. These exclusive marital classifications can permissibly
restrict a homosexual's right to marry, but the heavy burden of justification is upon the state. Under the strictures of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the state can only interfere with
the individual's decision to marry if it has sufficiently compelling interests in so doing and uses means closely tailored to achieving only those
interests. The reasons thus far advanced by the states and the courts
that have addressed the issue of same-sex marriage have not met this
heavy constitutional burden. The long tradition of discrimination, hatred, and repugnance toward a group of human beings with an emotional and sexual preference different from the majority of people
should not be sufficient justification for denying basic human rights.
CatherineM. Cullem

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1979

23

